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ORIGINAL INDIAN TITLE*
By
I.

R

FELIX S.

COHEN**

Indian Clouds on Land Grant Titles.

decisions of the Supreme Court recognizing the validity
of original Indian title' make the existence and extent of
such aboriginal ownership a relevant issue in title examinations
whenever a chain of title is traced back to a federal grant or patent.
Grantees who have relied on the Great Seal of a federal department as assuring the validity of land grant titles have not infrequently discovered to their sorrow the truth of the old French
saying, "M~me le plus belle fille du monde ne peut donner que ce
que I'A." Not even the Federal Government can grant what it
does not have. The nature of Indian title and its extinguishment
thus becomes, in those states that have been carved out of the
Federal.public domain, a matter of concern to real property lawyers
generally.
The leading Supreme Court case that establishes the invalidity
of federal grants that ignore Indian title is the case of Moose
Dung 2 (such being the polite English translation of Chief Monsimoh's Chippewa name). Here a federal lease which appeared on
its face to be perfectly valid, and which had been specially confirmed by a joint resolution of Congress, 3 was held invalid by the
Supreme Court, on the ground that neither the Secretary of the
Interior nor the Congress of the United States had constitutional
power to disregard Indian property rights. The right to dispose of
this property, the Court held, was vested in the Indian owner,
Chief Moose Dung the Younger. By tribal custom he was entitled
to the land that had been promised 4 to his father, Chief Moose
Dung the Elder. The Court accordingly held that Jones, the lessee
under, a lease executed and approved by the Department of the
ECENT

*The views herein expressed are only those of the writer and do not
necessarily reflect the views of any Government department or agency. F.S.C.
**Associate Solicitor and Chairman, Board of Appeals, U. S. Department of Interior; Visiting Lecturer, Yale Law School.
1. United States as Guardian of the Hualpai Indians v. Santa Fe Pacific
R.R., (1941) 314 U. S. 339; United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks,
(1946) 329 U. S. 40.
2. Jones v. Meehan, (1899) 175 U. S. 1.
3. Joint Resolution of August 4, 1894, 28 Stat. 1018.
4. By Section 9 of the Treaty of October 2, 1863, 13 Stat. 667, 671.
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Interior,' could be evicted by the Meehans, who had relied on an
unapproved lease, allowing the use of land for lumbering purposes,
granted by the Indian owner, the younger Moose Dung. The
Supreme Court summed up its decision in these words:
"The title to the strip of land in controversy, having been
granted by the United States to the elder chief Moose Dung by the
treaty itself, and having descended, upon his death, by the laws,
customs and usages of the tribe, to his eldest son and successor as
chief, Moose Dung the younger, passed by the lease executed by
the latter in 1891 to the plaintiffs for the term of that lease; and
their rights under that lease could not be divested by any subsequent action of the lessor, or of Congress, or of the Executive
Departments." (At p. 32.)
Standing by itself, the decision in Jones v. Meehan might be
narrowly interpreted as applying only where Indian land rights
were assured and recognized by treaty. But the case of Cramer v.
United States,0 decided 24 years later, made it plain that the
Supreme Court would not so limit the rule of respect for Indian
title. For in the Cramer case the Indian title had never been recognized by treaty, act of Congress, or Executive order. What was
involved was an area claimed by Indians by right of occupancy
initiated before 1859. Yet the Supreme Court held that the Indian
right of occupancy, even though it had not been formally recognized, was not terminated by a subsequent statutory'grant. In this
case the Court did not face the constitutional question of whether
a valid grant divesting Indian title could have been made to the
railroad, since it was able to put upon the Congressional grant a
narrow construction that saved the land rights of the Indians.
The railroad land grant statute7 in the Cramer case had excepted
from the scope of the grant all lands "reserved . . . or otherwise

disposed of." The Department of the Interior, in 1904, issued patents to the Central Pacific Railway Company, on the assumption
that there was no reservation or other encumbrance to prevent the
passage of full title to the grantee. Yet the Supreme Court, in
5. The Interior lease of 1894 had the approval of all the descendants of
'Moose Dung the Elder, but the Court considered this irrelevant, on the
ground that the Interior Department had no authority to disregard tribal
customs on questions of inheritance and that, according to Chippewa custom,
the eldest son took the land and had full power to dispose of its use. The Court
quoted with approval (at p. 31) the comment of Justice Brewer (then Circuit
judge) in a somewhat similar case, that the Secretary of the Interior "had no
judicial power to adjudge a forfeiture, to decide questions of inheritance, or
to divest the owner of his title without his knowledge or consent." Richardville v. Thorp, (C.C., D. Kans., 1866) 28 Fed. 52, 53.
(. (1923) 261 U. S. 219.
7. Act of July 25, 1866, 14 Stat. 239.
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1923, held that this departmental action disregarding Indian rights
was erroneous. "The fact that such [Indian] right of occupancy
finds no recognition in any statute or other formal governmental
action is not conclusive. The right, under the circumstances here
disclosed, flows from a settled governmental policy." (at p. 229).
The policy on which the Supreme Court based its decision in
the Cramer case it spelled out in these words:
"Unquestionably it has been the policy of the Federal Government from the beginning to respect the Indian right of occupancy,
which could only be interfered with or determined by the United
States. Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U. S. 517, 525; Minnesota v.
Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373, 385. It is true that this policy has had
in view the original nomadic tribal occupancy, but it is likewise
true that in its essential spirit it applies to individual Indian
occupancy as well; and the reasons for maintaining it in the latter
case would seem to be no less cogent, since such occupancy being
of a fixed character lends support to another well understood policy,
namely, that of inducing the Indian to forsake his wandering habits
and adopt those of civilized life. That such individual occupancy
is entitled to protection finds strong support in various rulings of
the Interior Department, to which in land matters this Court has
always given much weight. Midway Co. v. Eaton, 183 U. S. 602,
609; Hastings & Dakota R. R. Co. v. Whitney, 132 U. S.357, 366.
That department has exercised its authority by issuing instructions from time to time to its local officers to protect the holdings
of non-reservation Indians against the efforts of white men to
dispossess them. See 3 L. D. 371; 6 L. D. 341; 32 L. D. 382. In
Poisal v.Fitzgerald, 15 L. D. 19, the right of occupancy of an
individual Indian was upheld as against an attempted homestead
entry by a white man. In State of Wisconsin, 19 L. D. 518, there
had been granted to the State certain swamp lands within an Indian
reservation, but the right of Indian occupancy was upheld, although the grant in terms was not subject thereto. In Ma-Gee-Sec
v. Johnson, 30 L. D. 125, Johnson had made an entry under Par.
2289, Rev. Stats., which applied to 'unappropriated public lands.'
It appeared that at the time of the entry and for some time thereafter the land had been in the possession and use of the plaintiff,
an Indian. It was held that under the circumstances the land was
not unappropriated within the meaning of the statute, and therefore not open to entry. In Schumacher z. State of Washington,
33 L. D. 454, 456, certain lands claimed by the State under a
school grant, were occupied and had been improved by an Indian
living apart from his tribe, but application for allotment had not
been made until after the State had sold the land. It was held
that the grant to the State did not attach under the provision excepting lands 'otherwise disposed of by or under authority of an
act of Congress.' Secretary Hitchcock, in deciding the case, said:
'It is true that the Indian did not give notice of his intention

19471

ORIGINAL INDIAN TITLE

to apply for an allotment of this land until after the State had
made disposal thereof, but the purchaser at such sale was
bound to take notice of the actual possession of the land by the
Indian if, as alleged, he was openly and notoriously in possession thereof at and prior to the alleged sale, and that the act
did not limit the time within which application for allotment
should be made.'
"Congress itself, in apparent recognition of possible individual
Indian possession, has in several of the state enabling acts required the incoming State to disclaim all right and title to lands
'owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes.' See 25 Stat. 676, c.
180, Par. 4, par. 2; 28 Stat. 107, c. 138, Par. 3, par. 2.
"The action of these individual Indians in abandoning their
nomadic habits and attaching themselves to a definite locality, 'reclaiming, cultivating and improving the soil and establishing fixed
homes thereon was in harmony with the well understood desire
of the Government which we have mentioned. To hold that by so
doing they acquired no possessory rights to which the Government
would accord protection, would be contrary to the whole spirit of
the traditional American policy toward these dependent wards of
the nation."
As against these general indications of a policy to respect Indian
occupancy rights, the defendant Cramer, the railroad's assignee,
argued that in this particular case the Interior Department had
concluded that the Indians had no rights to the land, had recognized
the title of the railroad grantee, and had in fact negotiated a lease
of the land from the defendant. This argument the Court 'rejected,
with the comment:
"Neither is the Government estopped from maintaining this
suit by reason of any act or declaration of its officers or agents.
Since these Indians with the implied consent of the Government
had acquired such rights of occupancy as entitled them to retain
possession as against the defendants, no officer or agent of the
Government had authority to deal with the land upon any other
theory. The acceptance of leases for the land from the defendant
company by agents of the Government was, under the circumstances, unauthorized and could not bind the Government; much
less could it deprive the Indians of their rights." (At p. 234.)
The lower court was accordingly instructed "to amend its decree so as to cancel the patent in respect of the lands possessed by
the Indians." (At p. 236.)
Such was the state of the law when, in 1925, the Department
of the Interior sought to patent half of the Hualapai Indian Reservation in Arizona to the Santa Fe Pacific Railway. The theory of
this transaction was that when the reservation was established in
1883 half of the land, i.e., the odd-numbered sections, already
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belonged to the railroad grantee under the act of July 27, 1866
(14 Stat. 292). Congress implicitly ratified this view of the situation when it authorized the Secretary of the Interior to arrange
an exchange of Indian and railroad lands within the reservation
which would simplify the boundaries between railroad and Indian
lands.8 But when the Interior Department tried to carry out the
mandate of Congress, the Indians and their friends 9 objected on
the ground that the railroad, rightfully, had no lands to exchange,
since aboriginal title long antedated the railroad grant. After some
years of protests, charges, counter-charges, and administrative
opinions rejecting the Indians' contentions,'0 a suit was instituted in
1937 to vindicate the possessory rights of the Indians. (Here, as
in the Cramer case, there was no treaty or act of Congress confirming or defining the Indians' rights). When the case reached the
Supreme Court in 1941, after two decisions against the Indians
in the lower courts, the Attorney General of Arizona filed a brief
urging that "Any suggestion by this Court that Indian tribes might
have rights in property enforcible in a court of law by the mere
fact of occupancy would at least cast a cloud upon the title to the
major portion of Arizona.""
Despite this warning, the Supreme Court unanimously decided
the issue in favor of the Indians, holding that Indian occupancy,
even though unrecognized by treaty or act of Congress, established p'roperty rights valid against non-Indian grantees such as
the defendant railroad. The Court did not have to face the constitutional issue which it decided in Jones v. Meehan, because here,
as in the Cramer case, there was language in the Congressional
granting act which could be interpreted as protecting and safeguarding Indian rights.
While the Court did not therefore, pass on the validity of any
legislation, it did necessarily pass on the validity of departmental
action purporting to recognize railroad rights to the exclusion of
Indian rights. With respect to this, the unanimous opinion of the
Court declared:
"Such statements by the Secretary of the Interior as that 'title
8. Act of February 20, 1925, 43 Stat. 954.
9. See lettei's and resolutions of Indian Rights Association and other
organizations printed in Walapai Papers, (1936) Sen. Doc. No. 273, 74th.
Cong., 2d sess., at pp. 251, 254-271, 308-315.
10. See Opinion of E. C. Finney, Solicitor of the Department of the
Interior, dated September 16, 1931, and letter of Assistant Attorney General
Richardson, dated Nov. 12, 1931, printed in Walapai Papers, supra note 9.

at pp. 319-327.
11.

Brief for the State of Arizona, et al., p. 2.
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to the odd-numbered sections' was in the respondent [railroad]
do not estop the United States from maintaining this suit. For
they could not deprive the Indians of their rights any more than
could the unauthorized leases in Craner v. United States, supra."
(at p. 355).
At the same time the Court rejected various other contentions
advanced by the railroad, such as the argument that Indian land
rights had been wiped out by the Mexican cession treaty 12 or by
acts of Mexican or Spanish sovereignty, or by a long course of
Congressional statutes opening western lands to settlement. The
upshot of the case was that on March 13, 1947, the trial court
entered a decree, consented to by all parties, establishing Indian
title to some 509,000 acres of land which two Departments of the
Government had promised to the defendant railroad. Notwithstanding the fears expressed by the Attorney General oLffArizona,
there has been no substantial decline in Arizona realty values as
a result of the decision.
The fears expressed by the Attorney General of Arizona were
not, on the surface, unreasonable. Concern lest arguments in favor
of the Indians might result in imposing vast liabilities on the
Federal Government led the Attorney General of the United States
in 1941, to decline to argue the case, so that the Indian side of the
case had to be presented by the Solicitor of the Department of the
Interior.
A similar fear was recently expressed by the three justices of
the Supreme Court who dissented from the decision of the Court
in the Alcea case' on the ground that this decision, awarding compensation for a taking of original Indian title, would set a precedent compelling the United States to pay other tribes for other
areas so taken, which "must be large" (at p. 56).
The fear that recognizing Indian title, or paying Indians for
land, would unsettle land titles everywhere and threaten the Federal
Government with bankrupthy would be well grounded if there were
any factual basis for the current legend of how we acquired the
United States from the Indians. If, as the cases hold, federal grants
are normally subject to outstanding Indian titles, and if, over extensive areas where such grants have been made, Indian title has
in fact never been lawfully extinguished, then a vast number of
titles must today be subject to outstanding Indian possessory
rights. The fact, however, is that except for a few tracts of land
12. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, February 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922.
13. Cited supra note 1.
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in the Southwest, practically all of the public domain of the continental United States (excluding Alaska) has been purchased from
the Indians. It was only because the Hualapai case fell within an
area where no Indian land cessions had been effected that the
railroad title was held invalid. This means, of course, that the
titles of railroads and other grantees of the Federal Government
elsewhere in the United States may likewise depend upon whether
the Federal Government took the precaution of settling with Indian
land owners before disposing of their land.
Fortunately for the security of American real estate titles, the
business of securing cessions of Indian titles has been, on the
whole, conscientiously pursued by the Federal Government, as long
as there has been a Federal Government. The notion that America
was stolen from the Indians is one of the myths by which we
Americans are prone to hide our real virtues and make our idealism look as hard-boiled as possible. We are probably the one great
nation in the world that has consistently sought to deal with an
aboriginal population on fair and equitable terms. We have not
always succeeded in this effort but our deviations have not been
typical.
It is, in fact, difficult to understand the decisions on Indian
title or to appreciate their scope and their limitations if one views
the history of American land settlement as a history of wholesale robbery. The basic historic facts are worth rehearsing before
we attempt analysis of the cases dealing with the character and
scope of original Indian title.
II. How We Bought M e United States"
Every American schoolboy is taught to believe that the lands
of the United States were acquired by purchase or treaty from
Britain, Spain, France, Mexico, and Russia, and that for all the
continental lands so purchased we paid about 50 million dollars
out of the Federal Treasury. Most of us believe this story as unquestioningly as we believe in electricity or corporations. We have
seen little maps of the United States in our history books and
big maps in our geography books showing the vast area that
Napoleon sold us in 1803 for 15 million dollars and the various
other cessions that make up the story of our national expansion.
As for the original Indian owners of the continent, the common
impression is that we took the land from them by force and pro14. Some of the material in this section appears in "How We Bought
the United States," Collier's, Jan. 19, 1946, pp. 23, 62, 77, and in an adaptation thereof in This Month, May, 1946, pp. 106-110.

1947]

ORIGINAL INDIAN TITLE

ceeded to lock them up in concentration camps called "reservations."
Notvithstanding this prevailing mythology, the historic fact
is that practically all of the real estate acquired by the United
States since 1776 was purchased not from Napoleon or any other
emperor or czar but from its original Indian owners."5 What we
acquired from Napoleon in the Louisiana Purchase was not real
estate, for practically all of the ceded territory that was not privately owned by Spanish and French settlers was still owned by the
Indians, and the property rights of all the inhabitants were safeguarded by the terms of the treaty of cession.:6 What we did acquire from Napoleon was not the land, which was not his to sell,
but simply the power to govern and to tax, the same sort of power
that we gained with the acquisition of Puerto Rico or the Virgin
Islands a century later.
It may help us to appreciate the distinction between a sale of
land and the transfer of governmental power if we note that after
paying Napoleon 15 million dollars for the cession of political
authority over the Louisiana Territory we proceeded to pay the
Indian tribes of the ceded territory more than twenty times this
sum for such lands in their possession as they were willing to
sell. And while Napoleon, when he took his 15 million dollars,
was thoroughly and completely relieved of all connections with
the territory, the Indian tribes were wise enough to reserve" from
15.

This discrepancy between common opinion and historic fact was

commented upon by Thomas Jefferson:

"That the lands of this country were taken from them by conquest, is not so general a truth as is supposed. I find in our historians
and records, repeated proofs of purchase, which cover a considerable

part of the lower country; and many more would doubtless be found
on further search. The upper country, we know, has been acquired

altogether by purchases made in the most unexceptional form."
(Thomas Jefferson, "Notes on the State of Virginia, 1781-1785,"

reprinted in Padover, The Complete Jefferson, (1943) p: 632.)

16. The Treaty of April 30, 1803, for the cession of Louisiana, provided:

"Art. III. The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated
in the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, according
to the principles of the Federal constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights,
advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States; and in the meantime they shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their

liberty, property, and the religion which they profess."

"Art. VI. The United States promise to execute such treaties and articles

as may have been agreed between Spain and the tribes and nations of Indians,
until by mutual consent of the United States and the said tribes or nations,
other suitable articles shall have been agreed upon."
17. "Indian reservations" acquired their name from the fact that when
Indians ceded land they commonly made "reservations" of land to be retained
in Indian ownership. This practice goes back at least to 1640, when Uncas,
the Mohican chief, deeded a large area to the Colony of Connecticut, out of
which he carved a reservation for himself and his tribe. See 1 Trumbull, History of Connecticut, (1818) p. 117.
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their cessibns sufficient land to bring them a current income that
exceeds each year the amount of our payment to Napoleon. One
of these reservations, that of the Osages, has thus far brought its
Indian owners 280 million dollars in oil royalties. Some other
Indian tribes, less warlike, or less lucky, than the Osages, fared
badly in their real estate transactions with the Great White Father.
But in its totality the account of our land transactions with the
Indians is not small potatoes. While nobody has ever calculated
the total sum paid by the United States to Indian tribes as consideration for more than two million square miles of land purchased from them, and any such calculation would have to take
account of the conjectural value of a myriad of commodities, special services, and tax exemptions, which commonly took the place
of cash, a conservative estimate would put the total price of Indian
lands sold to the United States at a figure somewhat in excess of
800 million dollars.
In some cases payment for ceded land has been long delayed.
Most of the State of California falls within an area which various
Indian tribes of that region had undertaken to cede to the United
States in a series of treaties executed in the 1850's. The treaties
called for a substantial payment in lands, goods, and services. The
Federal Government took the land but the Senate refused to ratify
the treaties, which were held in secret archives for more than half
a century. Eventually Congress authorized the Indians to sue in the
Court of Claims for the compensation promised under the unratified treaties,' 8 and that Court found that the Indians were entitled
to receive $17,053,941.98, from which, however, various past expenditures by the Federal Government for the benefit of the California Indians had to be deducted. The net recovery amounted to
$5,024,842.34.
The settlement of the California land claims closes a chapter
in our national history. Today we can say that from the Atlantic
to the Pacific our national public domain consists, with rare exceptions, 19 of lands that we have bought from the Indians. Here
and there we have probably missed a tract, or paid the wrong
Indians for land they did not own and neglected the rightful owners. But the keynote of our land policy has been recognition of
18. Act of May 18, 1928, 45 Stat. 602.
19. The most significant exception is Alaska, where the Federal Government has not yet acquired any land from any of the native tribes. Cf. Miller
v. United States, (C.C.A. 9th, 1947) 159 F. (2d) 997. Other areas for which
no comiensation appears to have been made are found in Southeastern California, Southern Nevada, Arizona and New Mexico. See Frontispiece to 4th
ed. of Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law (1945).
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Indian property rights.20 And this recognition of Indian property
rights, far from hampering the development of our land, was of
the greatest significance in such development. Where the Govern20. The Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 1872 contains the following illuminating comments:
"Such being the right of the Indians to the soil, the United States for
more than eighty-five years pursued a uniform course of extinguishing the
Indian title only with the consent of those Indian tribes which were recognized as having claim by reason of occupancy: such consent being expressed
in treaties, to the formation of which both parties approached as having equal
rights of initiative, and equal rights in negotiation. These treaties were made
from time to time (not less than 372 being embraced in the General Statutes
of the United States) as the pressure of white settlements or the fear or the
experience of Indian hostilities made the demand for the removal of one
tribe after another urgent imperative. Except only in the case of the Indians
in Minnesota, after the outbreak of 1862, the United States Government has
never extinguished an Indian title as by right of conquest; and in this latter
case the Government provided the Indians another reservation, besides giving
them the proceeds of the sales of the lands vacated by them in Minnesota.
So scrupulously up to that time had the right of the Indians to the soil been
respected, at least in form. It is not to be denied that wrong was often done
in fact to tribes in the negotiation of treaties of cession. The Indians were
not infrequently overborne or deceived by the agents of the Government in
these transactions; sometimes, too, unquestionably, powerful tribes were
perniitted to cede lands to which weaker tribes had a better claim, but,
formally at least, the United States accepted the cession successively of all
lands to which Indian tribes could show color of title, which are embraced
in the limits of any of the present States of the Union, except California and
Nevada. Up to 1868, moreover, the greater portion of the lands embraced
within the present Territories of the United States, to which Indians could
establish a reasonable claim on account of occupancy, had also been ceded tc
the United States in treaties formally complete and ratified by the Senate
"This action of Congress [terminating the process of making treaties
with Indian tribes] does, however, present questions of considerable interest
and of much difficulty, viz: What is to become of the rights of the Indians to
the soil, over portions of territory which had not been covered by treaties at
the time Congress put an end to the treaty system? What substitute is to
be provided for that system, with all its absurdities and abuses? How are
Indians, never yet treated with, but having every way as good and as complete rights to portions of our territory as had the Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws, and Chickasaws, for instance, to the soil of Georgia, Alabama, and
Mississippi,/to establish their rights? How is the Government to proceed to
secure their relinquishment of their lands, or to determine the amount of
compensation which should be paid therefor? Confiscation, of course, would
afford a very easy solution for all difficulties of title, but it may fairly be
assumed that the United States Government will scarcely be disposed to
proceed so summarily in the face of the unbroken practice of eighty-five years,
witnessed in nearly four hundred treaties solemnly ratified by the Senate.
not to speak of the two centuries and a half during which the principal
nations of Europe, through all their wars and conquests, gave sanction to the
rights of the aborigines.
"The limits of the present report will not allow these questions to be
discussed; but it is evident that Congress must soon, if it would prevent complications and unfortunate precedents, the mischiefs of which will not be easily
repaired, take up the whole subject together, and decide upon what principles
and by what methods the claims of Indians who have not treaty relations
with the Government on account of their original interest to the soil, shall
be determined and adjusted * * *."
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ment had to pay Indians for land it could not afford to give the land
away to favored retainers who could, in turn, afford to hold the
land in idleness. Because land which the Government had paid for
had to be sold to settlers for cash or equivalent services, our West
has escaped the fate of areas of South America, Canada, and
Australia, which, after being filched from native owners, were
turned over, at the same price, to court favorites, Government
bureaus, or other absentee owners incapable of, or uninterested
in, developing the potential riches of the land.
Granted that the Federal Government bought the country from
the Indians, the question may still be raised whether the Indians
received anything like a fair price for what they sold. The only
fair answer to that question is that except in a very few cases
where military duress was present the price paid for the land was
one that satisfied the Indians. Whether the Indians should have
been satisfied and what the land would be worth now if it had
never been sold are questions that lead us to ethereal realms of
speculation. The sale of Manhattan Island for $24 is commonly
cited as a typical example of the white man's overreaching. But
even if this were a typical example, which it is not, the matter of
deciding whether a real estate deal was a fair bargain three hundred years after it took place is beset by many pitfalls. Hindsight
is better than foresight, particularly in real estate deals. Whether
the land the Dutch settlers bought would become a thriving metropolis or remain a wilderness, whether other Indian tribes or European powers would respect their title, and how long the land would
remain in Dutch ownership were, in 1626, questions that were
hid in the mists of the future. Many acres of land for which the
United States later paid the Indians in the neighborhood of $1.25
an acre, less costs of surveying, still remain on the land books of
the Federal Government, which has found no purchasers at that
price and is now content to lease the lands for cattle grazing at a
net return to the Federal Government of one or two cents per
annum per acre.
Aside from the difference between hindsight and foresight,
there is the question of the value of money that must be considered
wherever we seek to appraise a 300-year-old transaction. There
are many things other than Manhattan Island that might have
been bought in 1626 for $24 that would be worth great fortunes
today. Indeed if the Indians had put the $24 they received for
Manhattan at interest at 6 per cent they could now, with the accrued interest, buy back Manhattan Island at current realty valua-
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tions and still have four hundred million dollars or more left over.
Besides which, they would have saved the billions of dollars that
have been spent on streets, harbors, aqueducts, sewers, and other
public improvements to bring the realty values of the island to
their present level.
Again in appraising the value of $24 worth of goods in 1626
one must take account of the cost of delivery. How much did it
cost in human life and labor to bring $24 worth of merchandise
from Holland to Manhattan Island across an almost unknown
ocean? What would $24 worth of food f.o.b. New York be worth
to an exploring party at the South Pole today that needed it?
These are factors which should caution against hasty conclusions as to the inadequacy of payments for land sales made" hundreds of years ago, even when such sales were made between
white men. But in the earliest of our Indian land sales we must
consider that representatives of two entirely different civilizations
were bargaining with things that had very different values to the
different parties. It is much as if a representative of another planet
should offer to buy sea water or nitrogen or some other commodity
of which we think we have a surplus and in exchange offer us
pocket television sets or other products of a technology higher than
our own. We would make our bargains regardless of how valuable
nitrogen or sea water might be on another planet and without
considering whether it cost two cents or a thousand dollars to
make a television set in some part of the stellar universe that
we could not reach. In these cases we would be concerned only
with the comparative value to us of what we surrendered and
what we obtained.
So it was with the Indians. What they secured in the way of
knives, axes, kettles and woven cloth, not to mention rum and
firearms, 2 1 represented produce of a superior technology with a
use value that had no relation to value in a competitive market
three thousand miles across the ocean. And what is probably more
important, the Indians secured, in these first land transactions,
something of greater value than even the unimagined products of
European technology, namely, a recognition of the just principle
that free purchase and sale was to be the basis of dealings between
the native inhabitants of the land and the white immigrants.
Three years after the sale of Manhattan Island the principle
21.

In addition to the items listed above, items commonly listed in the

earliest treaties are: flints, scissors, sugar, clothing, needles and hoes. Later

treaties commonly mention horses, cattle, hogs, sheep, farm implements,

looms, sawmills, flour mills, boats, and wagons.
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that Indian lands should be acquired only with the consent of the
Indians was written into the laws of the Colony of New Netherlands:
"The Patroons of New Netherlands, shall be bound to purchase from the Lords Sachems in New Netherland, the soil where
they propose to plant their colonies, and shall acquire such right
thereunto as they will agree for with the said Sachems." 2
Connecticut, New Jersey, and Rhode Island were quick to adopt
similar laws and within a short time all of the colonies had adopted
laws in the same vein. Only in Massachusetts and North Carolina
were there significant departures from this just and honorable
policy. In North Carolina generally anarchic conditions left individual settlers relatively free to deal with or dispose of Indians as
they pleased, with the result that less than half of the State was
actually purchased from the natives. In Massachusetts, although
Plymouth Colony "adopted the just policy of purchasing from
the natives the lands they desired to obtain" (Royce, op. cit. p.
601), Puritan Massachusetts, with much pious citation of Old
Testament precedents, asserted the right to disregard Indian claims
to unimproved and uncultivated lands. Despite this claim, the
Puritans were prudent enough to purchase considerable areas of
land from the native inhabitants.
In 1636 one of the most famous real estate transactions in
American history took place when Chief Canonicus of the Narragansetts granted to Roger Williams and his 12 companions,
"all that neck of land lying between the mouths of Pawtucket
and Moshasuck rivers, that they might sit down in peace upon it
and enjoy it forever."
Here, as Williams observed to his companions,
"The Providence of God had found out a place for them among
savages, where they might peaceably worship God according to
their consciences; a privilege which had been denied them in all
the Christian countries they had ever been in."
Perhaps it was only natural that the first settlers on these
shores, who were for many decades outnumbered by the Indians
and unable to defeat any of the more powerful Indian tribes in
battle, should have adopted the prudent procedure of buying lands
that the Indians were willing to sell instead of using the more
direct methods of massacre and displacement that have commonly
prevailed in other parts of the world. What is significant, however,
22. New Project of Freedoms and Exemptions, Article 27, reprinted
in Royce, Indian Land Cessions in the United States (18th Annual Report,
U. S. Smithsonian Institute, 1900) p. 577.
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is that at the end of the 18th Century when our population east
of the Mississippi was at least 20 times as great as the Indian
population in the same region and when our army of Revolutionary
veterans might have been used to break down Indian claims to
land ownership and reduce the Indians to serfdom or landlessness,
we took seriously our national proclamation that all men are
created equal and undertook to respect the property xights which
Indians had enjoyed and maintained under their rude tribal governments. Our national policy was firmly established in the first
great act of our Congress, the Northwest Ordinance of July 13,
1787, which declared:
"Art. 3. * * * The utmost good faith shall always be observed
towards the Indians; their land and property shall never be taken
from them without their consent; and in their property, rights
and liberty, they never shall be invaded .or disturbed, unless in
just and lawful wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded in
justice and humanity shall from time to time be made, for preventing wrongs being done to them, and for preserving peace and
friendship with them."
Here was a principle of government far higher than contemporary standards of private dealing. During much of this period
pioneers were shooting Indians and denouncing the long arm of
the Federal bureaucracy that tried to protect Indian lands from
trespass and Indians from debauchery. 23 The most famous of all
Indian cases 24 was one in which the Supreme Court of the United
States denied the power of the State of Georgia to invade the territory of the Cherokees, guaranteed by Federal treaty, and the
State of Georgia defied the mandate of the Court, whereupon the
tough Indian fighter in the White House grimly declared: "John
Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it."'25 But
the Congress and the Federal Courts stood by the principle of respect for Indian possessions until it won common acceptance.
As far back in our national history as 1794 we find the United
State agreeing to pay the Iroquois, for a cession of land, the sum
of $4,500 annually forever, in "clothing, domestic animals, implements of husbandry, and other utensils * * * and in compensating
useful artificers who shall * * * be employed for their benefit."2 6
23. This refrain is still heard in remote mining towns of Arizona and
in Alaska, particularly among survivors of the Alaskan Gold Rush, who

knew what to do when they saw an Indian.
24. Worcester v. Georgia, (1833) 6 Pet. 515.

25. Greeley, American Conflict (1864), voL 1, p. 106.

26. Treaty of November 11, 1794, 7 Stat. 44.
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The payments are still being made, with much ceremony. In 1835
we find the Federal Government buying a tract of land from the
Cherokees for 5 million dollars, 27 a very large part of the annual
national budget in those days.2 8 In 1904 the Turtle Mountain
Chippewa, sold a large part of North Dakota to the United States
for one million dollars.2 To this day we are paying Indians for
lands long ago conveyed. Only occasionally does this payment
take the form of cash. Far-seeing Indian chiefs knew that cash
would soon be dissipated and leave later generations helpless in
an alien world that bad no place for ancient skills of hunters.
Regularly the old treaties called for payments in goods, chiefly
agricultural implements and cattle, in services-above all medical
services and education-and in such special privileges as exemption from certain land taxes, because of which the Federal Government must now furnish to Indians many services which States and
counties refuse to provide. It was to furnish these services that
the Indian Bureau was established, and to this day the appropriations to that Bureau go primarily to paying for these promised
services. We have already spent at least one and a half billion
dollars on our Indian population, and more than half of this sum
is traceable to obligations based on land cessions.
This is not to say that our Indian record is without its dark
pages. We have fallen at times from the high national standards
we set ourselves.
The purchase of more than two million square miles of land
from the Indian tribes represents what is probably the largest real
estate transaction in the history of the world. It would be miraculous if, across a period of 150 years, negotiations for the purchase
and sale of these lands could be carried on without misunderstandings and inequities. We have been human, not angelic, in our realestate transactions. We have driven hard Yankee bargains when
we could; we have often forgotten to make the payments that we
promised, to respect the boundaries of lands that the Indians reserved for themselves, or to respect the privileges of tax exemption, or hunting and fishing, that were accorded to Indian tribes in
exchange for the lands they granted us. But when Congress has
been fairly apprised of any deviation from the plighted word
of the United States, it has generally been willing to submit to
27. Treaty of December 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478.
28. The total expenditures of the Federal Government in 1835 amounted
to 17.6 million dollars. See Report of Secretary of the Treasury (1946), p. 366 .
29. Act of April 21, 1904, 33 Stat. 189, 195.

1947]

ORIGINAL INDIAN TITLE

143

court decision the claims of any injured Indian tribe.3 0 And it has
been willing to make whatever restitution the facts supported for
wrongs committed by blundering or unfaithful public servants.
There is no nation on the face of the earth which has set for itself
so high a standard of dealing with a native aboriginal people as
the United States and no nation on earth that has been more selfcritical in seeking to rectify its deviations from those high standards.
The 5 million dollar judgment won by the California Indians
is only the most recent of a series of awards won by Indian tribes
in the Federal Courts. In 1938 the Supreme Court awarded the
Shoshone Tribe of Wyoming a judgment of $4,408,444.23, as
compensation for the loss of a part of the Shoshone Reservation
which Federal authorities illegally (i.e. without the consent of the
Shoshone owners of the reservation) assigned to Indians of another tribe.31 The same session of the Court affirmed a judgment
in favor of the Klamath Indians for $5,313,347.32, the value of
lands reserved by the Klamaths for their own use which the
United States erroneously conveyed to the State of Oregon.8 2
What is important about these cases is that they represent an
honest, if sometimes belated, effort to make good on the promises
that the Federal Government has made to Indian tribes in acquiring
the land of this nation. And, as a great leader of the 30 million
Indians who dwell south of our borders has said, what is great
about democracy is not that it does not make mistakes, but that
it is willing to correct the human mistakes it has made. 33
III. The DoctrinalOrigins of Indian Title.
The decisions on Indian title can hardly be understood unless
it is recognized that dealings between the Federal Government
and the Indian tribes have regularly been handled as part of our
international relations. As in other phases of law which turn on
international relations, common law concepts have become heavily
overlaid with continental jurisprudence. Our concepts of Indian
title derive only in part from common law feudal concepts. In the
30. For many decades such cases were tried under special jurisdictional
acts. By the act of August 6, 1946. all existing tribal claims against the Government were referred to a special Indian Claims Commission, and jurisdiction
was granted to the Court of Claims to hear and decide all future tribal claims.
See 60 Stat. 1049, 25 U. S. C. A. (1946 Supp.) 70, 28 U. S. C. A. (1946
Supp.) 259a.
31. United States v. Shoshone Tribe, (1938) 304 U. S. 111.
32. United States v. Klamath Indians, (1938) 304 U. S. 119.
33. Padilla, Free Men of America (1943) 71.
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main, they are to be traced to Spanish origins, and particularly
to doctrines developed by Francisco de Vitoria, the real founder
34
of modern international law.
The argument that Indians stood in the way of civilization
and that progress demanded that they be pushed from the lands
they claimed, fell as lightly from the lips of 16th century pirates
and conquistadores as it does from those of the 20th century. The
contrary suggestion, first advanced by Vitoria, a university professor at Salamanca, that Indians were human beings and that
their land titles were entitled to respect even when not graced by
seals and ribbons, was denounced as "long haired idealism" by
"practical minded" men in the 16th century, as it is today. But,
in the long run, this idealistic and supposedly impractical concept
of human rights helped to build the greatest state and the strongest economy in the world. The conquistadores and pirates of 16th
century Spain and their lawyer spokesmen, in attempting to justify
a wholesale seizure of Indian lands in the New World, urged that
Indians were heretics, tainted with mortal sin, and irrational. To
this argument Vitoria replied that even heretics and sinners were
entitled to own property and could not be punished for their sins
without trial, and that the Indians were at least as rational as
some of the people of Spain. Vitoria cites as precedents, in support of Indian property rights, cases of heretics and sinners in
Europe and in ancient Palestine whose rights were acknowledged
by the highest Church authorities. Implicit in the argument is
the doctrine that certain basic rights inhere in men as men not by
reason of their race, creed, or color, but by reason of their humanity.
To the argument that the Pope had given Indian lands to the
Kings of Spain and Portugal, Vitoria replied that the Pope had
"no temporal power over Indian aborigines" (De Indis II, 6).
Thus a division of the New World by the Pope could serve only
as an allocation of zones for trading and proselytizing purposes,
not as a distribution of land (De Indis III, 10).
The shibboleth of "title by discovery" Vitoria disposes of sum34. James Brown Scott, former Solicitor for the Department of State
and President of the American Institute of Law, the American Society of
International Law, and the Institut de Droit International, in his brochure
on The Spanish Origin of International Law (1928), comments: "In the lecture of Vitoria on the Indians, and in his smaller tractate on War, we have
before our very eyes, and at hand, a summary of the modem law of nations."
The Seventh Pan-American Conference, on December 23, 1943, acclaimed
Vitoria as the man "vho established the foundations of modern international
law."
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marily. Discovery gives title to lands not already possessed. But
as the Indians "were true owners, both from the public and the
private standpoint," the discovery of them by the Spaniards had no
more effect on their property than the discovery of the Spaniards
by the Indians had on Spanish property. 35
The doctrine of Vitoria was given papal support in 1537 by"
the Bull Sublimis Deus, in which Pope Paul III proclaimed:
"We, who, though unworthy, exercise on earth the power of
our Lord and who seek with all our might to bring those sheep of
His flock who are outside, into the fold committed to our charge,
consider, however, that the Indians are truly men and that they
are not only capable of understanding the Catholic faith but, according to our information, they desire exceedingly to receive it.
Desiring to provide ample remedy for these evils, we define and
declare by these our letters, or by any translation thereof signed
by any notary public and sealed with the seal of any ecclesiastical
dignitary, to which the same credit shall be given as to the originals,
that,, notwithstanding whatever may have been or ray be said to
the contrary, the said Indians and all other people who may later
be discovered by Christians, are by no means to be deprived of
their liberty or the possession of their property, even though they
be outside the faith of Jesus Christ; and that they may and should,
freely and legitimately, enjoy their liberty and the possession of
their property; nor should they be in any way enslaved; should
the contrary happen, it shall be null and of no effect."
Almost word for word, this declaration of human rights is reechoed in the first important law of the United States on Indian relations, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, adopted two years before
the Federal Constitution. 36
Vitoria's doctrine of respect for Indian possessions became
the guiding principle of Spain's Laws of the Indies; the parallel
promise of the Northwest Ordinance became the guiding principle
of our Federal Indian law.3 7 Conquistadores, pirates, and even
administrative officials sworn to obey the law have not always
adhered to this high principle. But if the principle of respect for
Indian possessions has not been applied at 100 percent of its
face value, it has been applied at least to the extent that $800,35. De Indis II, 7. Cf. Marshall, C. J., in Worcester v. Georgia, (1832)
6 Pet. 515: "It is difficult to comprehend the proposition that the inhabitants
of either quarter of the globe could have rightful original claims of dominion
over the inhabitants of the other, or over the lands they occupied; or that
the discovery of either by the other should give the discoverer rights in the
country discovered, which annulled the pre-existing rights of its ancient
possessors." (At p. 543.)
36. See supra p. 41.
37. See F. S. Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law
of the United States, (1942) 31 Geo. Law Jr. 1.
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000,000.00 or so of Federal funds has so far been appropriated for
the purchase of Indian lands. To pay $800,000,000.00 for a principle is not a common occurrence in the world's history, but in the
long run this impractical "long haired" expenditure has probably
proved the wisest investment the United States ever made.
Fair dealing by the Federal Government cemented the loyalty
of Indians to the United States, a loyalty which has been an important factor in every war we have fought, and as well in all our
years of peace. Fair dealing by the Federal Government assuaged
the outrages committed on Indians by their neighbors3" and helped
to preserve a people who, without Federal protection, might have
succumbed to the rapacity of European civilization. Each year
Indian contributions to our economy run to many times the amount
we have paid the Indians for their lands, and the Indian contribution to our economy and our American way of life is far from
being exhausted. Though we owe to the Indian many of our
sports, recreations, highways, drugs, food habits, and political
institutions, 39 and most of our agricultural staples, 40 we have
still to acquire from the Indian many skills and intangible resources that would be lost forever if Indian cultures were forthwith destroyed, as many chauvinists advocate. 41
It is against this historical background of fact and doctrine
that the cases on Indian title must be viewed if they are to be
understood. Only against such a background is it possible to distinguish between those cases that mark the norms and patterns of
our national policy and those that illustrate the deviations and
pathologies resulting from misunderstanding and corruption. It
38. "Because of the local ill feeling, the jeople of the States where they
are found are often their deadliest enemies." United States v. Kagama, (1886)
118 U. S. 375, 384. Denial of the right of Indians to vote and receive social
security benefits is found today only in the two states most recently admitted
to the Union, Arizona and New Mexico. Efforts of the Federal Government
to end these discriminations have met much local hostility, as have Federal
efforts to protect native land rights in Alaska where the frontier spirit still
prevails.
39. See the essay of Lucy M. Kramer on "Indian Contributions to
American Culture," in Indians Yesterday and Today, (U.S. Dept. of Interior,
1941).
40. It has been estimated by competent authorities that four-sevenths
of the total agricultural production in the United States (in farm value)
consists of plants domesticated by Indians and taken over by whites, and it
has been noted that where the whites took over plants they also took over
Indian method of planting, irrigation, cultivation, storage, and use. See
Edwards, Agriculture of the American Indian, (U.S. Dept. of Agriculture,
1933) p. v.; Bureau of American Ethnology Bulletin No. 30, vol. 1, p. 25.
41. The 1890 Census Report on Indians, at p. 57, shows the high-water
mark of such chauvinism. See F. S. Cohen, "Indian Claims," (1945) The
American Indian, vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 4-5.
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is perhaps inevitable that any high ideal should prove too hard
to live by in times of stress, but when a principle has survived the
stresses of many wars, financial panics, and outbreaks of chauvinism, it becomes important to distinguish the basic principle from
the "scattering" forces, just as it becomes important to distinguish
in physics betveen the principle of gravitation and the deflecting
forces of air friction, air pressure, terrestrial motion, etc., that
make some bodies drop slantwise or rise instead of dropping. Indeed, it is only with some understanding of the norms of institutional conduct that one can determine whether the norms of the
past are continuing to exert their influence, or whether the deviations of yesterday will be the norms of tomorrow.
IV. The Cases.
The cases on original Indian title show the development across
twelve decades of a body of law that has never rejected its first
principles. The law of Indian title is thus particularly susceptible
to historical analysis. Ten cases fix its outlines.
42
1. The Sovereign's Title: Johnson v. McIntosh.
The first important Indian case decided by the Supreme Court
established the proposition that a private individual claiming title
to land by reason of .3 private purchase from an Indian tribe not
consented to by the sovereign, could not maintain that title against
the United States 'jr its grantees, where the United States had
acquired the land in question from the Indians by treaty. The dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint in this case was not based upon
any defect in the Indians' title, but solely upon the invalidity of
the Indian deed through which the white plaintiffs claimed title.
When the case was decided, the land (on the Wabash River) had
not been occupied by Indians for some fifty years. They had received more than $55,000.00 for the land from the original vendees,
Moses Franks, Jacob Franks and their associates, they had then
sold the same land to the United States,43 and they had removed
from the tract that they had sold. At the time of the Federal grant
to the defendants, in 1818, there was no Indian title to encumber
the grant. The decision of the court that a private sale of Indian
lands not consented to by the sovereign gave the purchaser no
valid title against the sovereign, has never been questioned in the
years since this decision was rendered, nor has there been any
42. (1923) 8 Wheat. 543.
43. Treaty of August 3, 1795, 7 Stat. 49; Treaty of June 7, 1803, 7
Stat. 74.
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successful challenge of the rule which the court then formulated,
viz., that Indian title could be extinguished only by, or with the
consent of, the Government. Justice Marshall's opinion in the case
makes it clear that while the sovereign could extinguish Indian
title by treaty or by war, Indian title would not be extinguished by
a grant to private parties and that such a grantee would take
the land subject to Indian possessory rights.
"* * * the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no instance,
entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent,
impaired. They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the
soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and
to use it according to their own discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will,
to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle that discovery gave exclusive title to those who
made it.
"While the different nations of Europe respected the right of
the natives, as occupants, they asserted the ultimate dominion to
be in themselves; and claimed and exercised, as a consequence of
this ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil, while yet in
possession of the natives. These grants have been understood by
all to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right
of occupancy." (At p. 574.)
It is perhaps Pickwickian to say that thz Federal Government
exercised power to make grants of lands still in Indian possession
as a consequence of its "dominion" or "title." A realist would say
that Federal "dominion" or "title" over land recognized to be in
Indian ownership was merely a fiction devised to get around a
theoretical difficulty posed by common law concepts. According to
the hallowed principles of the common law, a grant by a private
person of land belonging to another would convey no title. To apply
this rule to the Federal Government would have produced a cruel
dilemma: either Indians had no title and no rights or the Federal
land grants on which much of our economy rested were void. The
Supreme Court would accept neither horn of this dilemma, nor
would it say, as a modern realist might say, that the Federal Government is not bound by the limitations of common law doctrine
and isfree to dispose of property that belongs to Indians or other
persons as long as such persons are paid for their interests before
their possession is impaired. But such a way of putting the matter
1would have run contrary to the spirit of the times by claiming for
the Federal Government a right to disregard rules of real property
law more sacred than the Constitution itself. And this theoretical
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dilemma was neatly solved by Chief Justice Marshall's doctrine that
the Federal Government and the Indians both had exclusive title.
to the same land at the same time. Thus a federal grant of Indian
land would convey an interest, but this interest would not become
a possessory interest until the possessory title of the Indians was
terminated by the Federal Government. The Indians were protected. The grantees were protected,-assuming that the Federal
Government went ahead to secure a relinquishment of Indian title.
The power of the Federal Government was recognized. And the
needs of feudal land tenure theory were fully respected. Even if
we are no longer interested in the niceties of theory, the reconciliation of Indian rights and grantee rights which Marshall worked out
must command our respect.
44
2. Indian Title vs. Colony and State: Worcester v. Georgia.
The second great landmark in the law of Indian title is established by Chief justice Marshall's opinion in Worcester v. Georgia,
where the land involved in suit was in the present possession of
Indians. The Supreme Court in this case decided that the State
of Georgia could not exercise jurisdittion over Indian lands, i.e.
that Indian title could not be ignored by a State. The Chief justice
took great care to point out that neither Johnson v. McIntosh nor
any other decision had denied the validity of Indian title, and that
the principle of sovereign title by "discovery" was in no wtay inconsistent with Indian title.
"This principle, acknowledged by all Europeans, because it was
the interest of all to acknowledge it, gave to the nation making the
discovery, as its inevitable consequence, the sole right of acquiring
the soil and of making settlements on it. It was an exclusive principle which shut out the right of competition among those [Europeans] who had agreed to it; not one wlhich could annul the previous rights of those who had not agreed to it. It regulated the
right given by discovery among the European discoverers; but
could not affect the rights of those already in possession, either as
aboriginal occupants, or as occupants by virtue of a discovery
made before the memory of man. It gave the exclusive right to
purchase, but did not found that right on a denial of the right of
the possessor to sell." (at p. 544)
Much of Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in this case may be
dismissed as unnecessary to the decision, and of course, strictly
speaking, no opinion or rule is ever logically necessary to any
decision.-" But certainly an important step in the process by which
44. (1932) 6 Pet. 515.
45. See F. S. Cohen, Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals, (1933) 34-35.
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the Supreme Court came to its decision in Worcester v. Georgia
was the conclusion that when the Crown gave to the Colony of
Georgia whatever rights and powers the Crown had in Cherokee
lands, this did not terminate or alter the Cherokee Nation's original
title, which survived the Crown grant and later became the basis
of Cherokee treaties with the Federal Government. The case thus
stands squarely for the proposition adumbrated in Johnson v.
McIntosh,4 61 that a grant by the sovereign of land in Ihdian occupancy does not abrogate original Indian title.
3. The Transferability and the Scope of Indian Title: Mitchel
47
v. United States.
Whereas Johnson v. McIntosh had held that an unauthorized
Indian sale could not give a title superior to that later obtained by
treaty, the case of Mitchel v. United States dealt with the obverse
situation where the Indian sale relied upon had been made with the
consent of the sovereign. In such case, the Court held, the purchaser from the Indians secured a title superior to any title which
the United States could assert. The United States, the Court held,
could not acquire from the king of Spain what was not the King's
property, and the property of Indians or their grantees could not
become royal or government property without formal judicial
action. 48 Indian property was no different in this respect from
the pioperty of white men:
"* * * One uniform rule seems to have prevailed from their

first settlement, as appears by their laws; that friendly Indians
were protected in the possession of the lands they occupied, and
were considered as owning them by a perpetual right of possession
in the tribe or nation inhabiting them, as their common property,
from generation to generation, not as the right of the individuals
located on particular spots.
"Subject to this right of possession, the ultimate fee was in the
crown and its grantees, which could be granted by the crown or
colonial legislatures while the lands remained in possession of the
Indians, though possession could not be taken without their consent."
(9 Pet. 711, at 745)
What had been conceded, by way of dictum, in Johnson v.
MIntosh, namely that Indian title included power to transfer as
well as to occupy, is the core of the decision in the Mitchel case.
Finally the Mitchel case clarifies the scope of the rule of re46. (1823) 8 Wheat. 543, at 591.
47. (1835) 9 Pet. 711.
48. "If the king has no original right of possession to lands, he cannot
acquire it without office found, so as to annex it to his domain." 9 Pet. at 743.
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spect for Indian possessions by expressly rejecting the view that
such possession extended only to improved lands. Said the Court:
"Indian possession or occupation was considered with reference
to their habits and modes of life; their hunting grounds were as
much in their actual possession as the cleared fields of the whites;
and their rights to its exclusive enjoyment in their own way and
for their own purposes were as much respected, until they abandoned them, made a cession to the government, or an authorized
sale to individuals." (At p. 745.)
4. Indian Title vs. The Sovereign in Louisiana Territory:
Choteau z. 111olony. 9
The Choteau case presents facts very similar to those in Johnson v. McIntosh, and reaffirms the holding of that case that one
who claims under an unauthorized grant of Indian lands cannot
prevail against a grantee whose title is based upon an Indian treaty
cession and a subsequent Federal grant. In the Choteazu case, however, the plaintiff's invalid grant was not invalid because it lacked
government consent. It was invalid because it lacked Indian consent. The Court held that under the Spanish law applicable in the
Louisiana Territory the possessory rights of the Fox Tribe of
Indians in lands aboriginally occupied by them were such that
any grants made by the Spanish Governor would be" "subject to
the rights of Indian occupancy. They would not take effect until
that occupancy had ceased, and whilst it continued it was not in
the power of the Spanish Governor to authorize anyone to interfere
with it" (p. 239). Thus the case recognizes, as did the Mitchel
case, that even a king cannot lawfully take possession of Indian
lands without Indian consent.
5. Indian Titles vs. Homesteaders : Holden v. Joy. °
The contention that Indian lands are public lands subject to
disposition as such, a contention which the Court had squarely
rejected in Worcester v. Georgia, Mitchel v. United States, and
Choteau v. Molony, was again made, in a somewhat novel guise,
in Holden v. Joy, and was again rejected by the Court. In this case
the defendant, Joy, claimed under certain Indian treaties, while the
plaintiff, Holden, claimed under preemption acts of Congress. On
behalf of the plaintiff's claim it was argued that the Constitution
expressly vests in Congress control over public property and that
a series of treaties made by the President and Senate with Indian
tribes could not constitutionally dispose of public land to the de49.
50.

(1853) 16 How. 203.
(1872) 17 Wall. (84 U.S.) 211.
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fendant in a manner that- conflicted with modes of public land
disposition prescribed by Congress and availed of by the plaintiff.
The Court, in rejecting that argument, and holding for the defendant, pointed out that the occupancy right in the land in question
had been in the Indians from the start and was therefore clearly
subject to disposition by Indian treaties.
In upholding the Indian title as a proper subject of treatymaking, the Court characterized aboriginal title in these terms:
"Enough has already been remarked to show that the lands conveyed to the United States ,bythe treaty were held by the Cherokees
under their original title, acquired by immemorial possession, commencing ages before the New World was known to civilized man.
Unmistakably their title was absolute, subject only to the preemption right of purchase acquired by the United States as the
successors of Great Britain, and the right also on their part as
such successors of the discoverer to prohibit the sale of the land
to any other governments or their subjects, and to exclude all
other governments from any interference in their affairs." (At p.
244.)
6. Indian Title and Railroad Grants: Buttz v. Northern Paci51
fic Railroad.
Buttz v. Northern Pacific R.R. is the first of the railroad grant
cases in which the principles enunciated in Johnson v.McIntosh and
Worcester v. Georgia were applied to the transcontinental railroads that sought passage across Indian lands. Notwithstanding
the vital importance of these railroads for the expanding national
economy, and the strong legislative backing which the railroads
,commanded, Congress when it gave millions of acres of public
land to the railroads in aid of construction scrupulously respected
Indian possessions, whether or not such possessions had been defined by treaty or act of Congress. The statutory grant in the
Buttz case 52 safeguarded Indian rights in these words:
"The United States shall extinguish, as rapidly as may be consistent with public policy and the welfare of the said Indians, the
Indian titles to all lands falling under the operation of this act,
and acquired in the donation to the [road] named in this bill."
Other railroad grants even went so far as to provide expressly
that such extinguishment of Indian title should be effected only
3
by "voluntary cessiorn."
The interpretation of these grants in the Buttz case and suc51. (1886) 119 U. S. 55.
52. Act of July 2, 1864, 13 Stat. 365, sec. 2.
53. Act of July 27, 1866, 14 Stat. 292, construed in United States v.
Santa Fe Pacific Ry. Co., (1941) 314 U. S.339, considered supra note 1.
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ceeding cases adhered to the principle that while a grant of land in
Indian possession may convey a legal fee, such a grant does not
impair the Indian title, which the grantee must respect until it
has been duly terminated by treaty, agreement, or other authorized
action of Congress or the Indians. Applying this rule in the Butte
case meant that the title originally conveyed to the railroad by the
Congressional grant of 1864 and perfected by Indian relinquishment of the land in 1873, for an agreed compensation, prevailed
over a settler's preemption title under the act of September 4,
1841, 5 Stat. 453, alleged to have been perfected by actual settlement in 1871. The basis of the Court's decision lay in the determination that "At the time the act of July 2, 1864, was passed the title
of the Indian tribes was not extinguished" (at p. 66), that this
was still the situation in 1871, and that, "The grant conveyed the
fee subject to this right of occupancy" (ibid.).
It is to be noted that the Indians' right of occupancy in 1864
had not yet been defined by any treaty. In 1867 a reservation was
set aside for the Indians involved, but the Court noted that this
did not of itself wipe out aboriginal possessory rights outside of
the reservation. The aboriginal Indian title in the area involved
in the Buttz case never was defined in any treaty or agreement
until the agreement of 1873 by which the land was ceded to the
United States. The Buttz case stands, therefore, as a clear warning
that neither settlers nor railroads can ignore aboriginal Indian
title.
7. Individual Indian Titles vs. The Railroads: Cramer v.
54
United States.
The Cramer case, which has already been discussed,5 5 is important in the development of the law of Indian title in two respects: (1) it establishes the proposition that individual and tribal
possessory rights are entitled to equal respect, and (2) it qualifies
the suggestion in the Butte case (at p. 71) that "Indians having
only a right of occupancy" do not have such "claims and rights"
as suffice to exclude lands entirely from a public grant. 56 In the
Buttz case this dictum was entirely justified since the grant act in
question provided that the Indian possession should not be disturbed by a grant of naked legal title. But where, as in the Cramer
case, there was no such express guaranty, the only way to protect
54. (1923) 261 U. S. 219.
55. See supra pp. 29-31.
56. This dictum provided the main line of argument for the'railroad in
tht Cramer case. See 261 U. S. 219, 220.
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the Indian title was to hold that land under Indian title was wholly
excluded from the grant. And this the Court did. Taken together,
the Buttz and Cramer cases hold that Indian title survives a railroad grant, either as an encumbrance upon the grant (Buttz) or as
an exception carved out of it (Cramer). In either case the grantee
cannot interfere with the Indian title.
8. The Scope of Indian Title: United States v. Shoshone
57
Tribe
Whether original Indian title comprises all elements of value
attached to the soil or whether such title extends only to such surface resources as the Indians knew and used was the central question decided in the Shoshone case. While the case involved a treaty,
the treaty was silent on the question of whether the "lands" which
were reserved to the Indians included the timber upon, and the
minerals below, the surface. The argument of the case therefore
turned primarily on the extent of the Indian tenure prior to the
treaty. The Government, represented by Solicitor General (now
Mr. Justice) Reed, argued that the Shoshones had a mere right
of occupation, which was "limited to those uses incident to the
cultivation of the land and the grazing of livestock," and that
the Government had an "absolute right to reserve and dispose of
the [other] resources as its own.""8 This view was further developed in the Government's main brief, signed by Solicitor General
(now Mr. Justice) Jackson, urging that original Indian title was
something sui generis, comprising only a "usufructuary right,"
and that such right "to use and occupy the lands did lot include
the ownership of the timber and mineral resources thereon."0 9 This
view was considered and rejected by the Court, Mr. Justice Reed
dissenting.6" The Court took the view that original Indian title
included every element of value that would accrue to a non-Indian
landowner. It concluded that the treaty did not cut down the scope
of the title of the Indians, "undisturbed possessors of the soil from
time immemorial," and declared:
"For all practical purposes, the tribe owned the land. * * * The
Fight of perpetual and exclusive occupancy of the land is not less
valuable than full title in *fee. * ***
...
*
*

57. (1938) 304 U. S. 111.
58. Brief for United States on petition for certiorari.
59. Brief for United States, pp. 7-24.
60. While Mr. Justice Reed was the sole dissenter from the decision in
the Shoshone case, he was joined by Justices Burton and Rutledge in a more
recent dissent, involving substantially the same contention that Indians are
"like paleface squatters on public lands without compensable rights if they
are evicted." United States v. Tillamooks, (1946) 329 U. S.40, 58.
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"Although the United States retained the fee, and the tribe's
right of occupancy was incapable of alienation or of being held
otherwise than in common, that right is as sacred and as securely
safeguarded as is fee simple absolute title. Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 48. Worcester v. Georgia, supra, 580. Subject
to the conditions imposed by the treaty, the Shoshone Tribe had
the right that has always been understood to belong to Indians,
undisturbed possessors of the soil from time immemorial." (At pp.
116-117).
At the same session of court the Supreme Court applied the
identical rule, in the case of the Klamath Indians,'6 1 to Indian

ownership of timber. The Klamath and Shoshone cases, taken together, overturned prevailing views as to the ownership of timber on Indian reservations. Earlier decisions of the Supreme Court
in United States v. Cook,62 and Pine River Logging Co. v. United
States0 3 to the effect that the Federal Government could replevin
logs sold without authority or recover the value thereof, had been
widely misconstrued as a denial of Indian rights to timber.6 4 When
this misinterpretation was set at rest in the Shoshone and Klamath
cases, Congress ordered that the proceeds of the judgment in the
Pine River case, which had been deposited to the credit of the
Government, should be transferred to the credit of the Indians. 65
These two decisions delivered a death blow to the argument that
aboriginal ownership extends only to products of the soil actually
utilized in the stone age culture of the Indian tribes.
9. Indian Title vs. Administrative Officials: United States as
Guardian of Hualpai v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Co.66
The main facts and the issues of the Walapai case have already
been noted.17 The significance of the case in the development of
the law of Indian title lies not in the recognition that Indian title
does not depend upon treaties nor even in the fact that the doctrine
of original Indian title was applied to the Mexican cession areaboth principles are established in earlier decisions, e.g. in the
Cramer case. More important is the fact that the aboriginal occupancy of an Indian tribe was here held to have survived a course
61. United States v. Klamath Indians, (1938) 304 U. S. 119; same case,

(1935) 296 U. S. 244.
62. (1873) 19 Wall. 591.

63. (1902) 186 U. S. 279.
64. See 29 Op. Att'y Gen. 239 (1911). And see F. S. Cohen, Handbook
of Federal Indian Law, pp. 313-316. The Government's brief in the Shoshone
case, incorporated by reference in its Klamath brief, placed chief reliance
upon this interpretation of the Cook and Pine River Logging Co. cases.
65. Act of June 5, 1938. 52 Stat. 688.
66. (1941) 314 U. S. 339.
67. See supra pp. 31-33.
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of congressional legislation and administrative action that had
proceeded on the assumption that the area in question was unencumbered public land. The decision thus stands as a warning to
purchasers of real property from the Federal Government, reminding them that not even the Government can give what it does
not possess.
10. Indian Title vs. The Federal Government: United States v.
Alcea Band of Tillamooks.65
The last large gap in the doctrine of original Indian title was
filled in by the Supreme Court's decision in the Alcea case, holding
that the Federal Government was bound to pay the Indians when
it took from them lands which they held under aboriginal ownership. 6 While the disagreements that split the Court three ways in
its opinion-writing make it dangerous to rely on anything the Court
said in this case, the fact stands out that the United States, after
taking land, by Congressional act, from Indians who had nothing
more than an unrecognized aboriginal title to it, was required, by
a five to three vote of the Supreme Court, to pay the Indians the
value of the land so taken. Certainly it can make no difference to
the Indians in the case whether, as Justice Black thought, they
are to be paid because Congress passed a jurisdictional act allowing
them to bring suit, or, as the four other justices in the majority
thought, and as the Court of Claims thought, because the action of
Congress a century ago established a liability which only came
before the Court for adjudication in 1947. The question of whether
rights depend upon remedies or vice versa is a metaphysical issue
on which lawyers have disagreed for at least two thousand years,
and it is scarcely likely that unanimity will be reached in the next
two thousand years. As long as the Indian gets paid for aboriginal
holdings that the Government takes from him, he will not quibble
70
about the reasons assigned for the decision.
68. (1946) 329 U. S. 40, aff'g (1945) 103 Ct. Cls. 494, 59 F. Supp. 934.
69. That no such liability arises when land not subject to original Indian
title is set aside temporarily for Indian use and then restored to the public
domain is the holding of two recent cases. Sioux Tribe v. United States,
(1942) 316 U. S. 317; Ute Indians v. United States, (1947) 330 U. S. 169.
The language and circumstances of the Executive orders setting up Indian
reservations vary so widely that generalizations from cases interpreting such
orders are of little value. See F. S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law,
pp. 299-302.
70. The meaning of the decision, from the standpoint of actual administration, is thus set forth in the statement of Commissioner of Indian Affairs
William A. Brophy:
"The Supreme Court has now held that original Indian title-even
though not accompanied by notary seals and ribbons-is as good as any white
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The difference between Justice Black's formulation of the rule
of liability and that of the other four justices of the majority is
not likely to affect any actual decisions. 71 The Indian Claims Act
of August 13, 194672 establishes a special forum to hear Indian
claims and among the claims assigned to this forum for determination are claims based upon a taking of land held under original
Indian title.7 3 The same act also provides for future determination of similar claims by the Court of Claims. 74 Since all five members of the majority in the Alcea case agreed that the combination
of (1) an uncompensated taking, and (2) a proper jurisdictional
act, jointly, provided a basis for recovery, and since the second
condition has been satisfied by general legislation, it follows that,
under the Alcea decision, if there has been an uncompensated taking, a recovery may now be had. For reasons already noted, the
areas within which such recoveries may be had are nowhere near
as great as has been commonly supposed, even by some of the
Supreme Court justices when they comment upon matters not
of record in the case before them. 71
The Alcea case gives the final coup de grace to what has been
man's title. It is good against the United States as well as against third
parties. Under recent legislation opening the courts to Indian grievances, the
Indians are held entitled to recover the value of any land that has been taken

away from them by the Government. This means the end of a long-standing

discrimination which made Indian land in the old days a prey to all sorts of

land-grab schemes and denied the Indians any redress or compensation. It is
the duty of all employees of the Office of Indian Affairs to see that Indian
land ownership is respected to the same degree as any other form of land
ownership. As the Supreme Court has said, whether a tract of land 'was
properly called a reservation.., or unceded Indian country.., is a matter
of little moment ... the Indians' right of occupancy has always been held to
be sacred; something not to be taken from him except by his consent, and
then only upon such consideration as should be agreed upon."'

71. It did affect the decision in Northwestern Bands of Shoshone
Indians v. United States, (1945) 324 U. S.335. There a majority of the
Court thought 'that the jurisdictional act did not authorize a suit based
on aboriginal title. A four-way split in the Court produced an affirmance of

the decision of the Court of Claims below, denying recovery. The limitations

of the Shoshone jurisdictional act have now been superseded by the Indian
Claims Act, which was passed, very largely, to overcome the injustices
which resulted from the Shoshone decision, injustices pointed out by two
of the justices (Black and Jackson, JJ.) voting with the majority in that
case. The Senate and House Committees which asked the Supreme Court
to allow the Indians a rehearing in this case, and were refused, saw to it that
the Indian Claims Act allowed such rehearings in all cases heretofore dismissed for jurisdictional reasons. See F. S. Cohen, "Indian Claims," (1945)
Amer. Indian, vol. 2, No. 3, p. 3. And see K. J. Selander, Section 2 of the
Indian Claims Commission Act, (1947) 15 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 388, 422.
72. (1946) 60 Stat. 1049, 25 U. S. C. A. (1946 Supp.) 70.
73. See sec. 2, 60 Stat. 1049, 1050, 25 U. S. C. A. (1946 Supp.) 70a.
74. See see. 24, 60 Stat. 1049, 1055, 28 U. S. C. A. (1946 Supp.) 259a.
75. See note 13 supra.
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called the "menagerie" theory of Indian title, 6 the theory that
Indians are less than human and that their relation to their lands
is not the human relation of ownership but rather something similar
to the relation that animals bear to the areas in which they may be
temporarily confined. The sources of this "menagerie" theory are
many and varied and sometimes elegantly pedigreed. There is
the feudal doctrine, which has seldom been heard in this country
for a century or so except in Indian cases, that ultimate dominion
over land rests in the sovereign. There is the echoing of a doctrine
that taking land from another nation by the sword creates no
justiciable rights-a doctrine that might have been proper enough
when the United States was waging war or making treaties with
the various Indian tribes, but is hardly relevant to the contemporary
scene, when all Indians are citizens and when Congress has provided that these citizens should be fully compensated for confiscated lands that they would own today if the Federal Government
had carried out the "fair and honorable dealings" that it first
pledged in 1787.
There are other subtler sources of the "menagerie" theory of
Indian reservations which are seldom set forth in legal briefs
but exert a deep influence on public administration. One of the
most insidious of these is the doctrine that the only good Indian
is a dead Indian, whence it follows, by frontier logic, that the
only good Indian title is one that has been extinguished, through
transfer to a white man or a white man's government. And finally
there is the more respectable metaphysical doctrine that since
government is the source of all rights there are no rights against
the Government, from which it may be deduced that Indians who
have been deprived of their possessions by governmental action
are without redress. All these doctrines, it may be hoped, have
been finally consigned to the dust bins of history by the course
of decisions of the Supreme Court that cumulates in the Alcea case.
That course of decisions now fully justifies the statement made
by President Truman some months before the Alcea decision was
handed down, on the occasion of his signing the Indian Claims
Act on August 13, 1946:
"This bill makes perfectly clear what many men and women,
here and abroad, have failed to recognize, that in our transactions
with the Indian tribes we have at least since the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787 set for ourselves the standard of fair and
honorable dealings, pledging respect for all Indian property rights.
76. See F. S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, p. 288.
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Instead of confiscating Indian lands, we have purchased from the
tribes that once owned this continent more than 90 per cent of
our public domain, paying them approximately 800 million dollars
in the process. It would be a miracle if in the course of these
dealings-the largest real estate transaction in history-we had not
made some mistakes and occasionally failed to live up to the precise
terms of our treaties and agreements with some 200 tribes. But
we stand ready to submit all such controversies to the judgment of
impartial tribunals. We stand ready to correct any mistakes we
have made."

